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Ukraine’s 1996 Constitution gave the 
President the greatest powers and the 
least accountability compared with 
other government bodies. The political 
reform should have increased both the 
accountability and responsibility of the 
government to voters and, in such a 
manner, have brought Ukraine closer to 
European standards. A Law amending the 
Constitution was adopted on 8 December 
2004 and came into force in 2006. Instead 
of optimizing the system of checks and 
balances, however, this political reform 
complicated relations among and within 
the various branches of government.
A review of reform, such as it was
The role of the President
Before the 2004 reforms, the President 
was able to appoint and dismiss the 
majority of top government officials and 
was de facto the Head of Government, 
holding the majority of political powers 
that normally would go to a Premier. By 
not signing into law the bills adopted 
by the Verkhovna Rada, the President 
could actually block the adoption of 
any law. At the same time, the President 
took no responsibility for actions of the 
Government.
After the Constitutional reforms, the 
right to form a Government was largely 
transferred to the Verkhovna Rada. A close 
political relationship was established 
between the legislature and the Cabinet: 
the Rada majority now had to form 
a coalition, which, in turn, formed a 
Government. Thus, the Government 
became the main executive body. The 
President continued to be the guarantor 
of the Constitution and to be responsible 
for foreign and security policy.
The Verkhovna Rada majority
Before the reform, the Constitution did 
not require that there be a standing 
majority in the legislature. And indeed, 
the Rada often operated on the basis of a 
strictly situational majority.
Since 2006, the Verkhovna Rada is 
obligated to establish a majority that 
forms the Government, supports its 
activity and is responsible for its actions. 
If such a majority is not set up within 
30 days, the President has the right to 
dissolve the legislature. 
Appointing and dismissing the Premier
Before, the Premier was appointed by 
the President, for which the President 
needed the rubber stamp of a Verkhovna 
Rada majority. The Premier could also be 
dismissed at any time by the President, 
which happened with great frequency, 
or by the Verkhovna Rada—but only if it 
failed to approve that Government’s yearly 
Program. In practice, the President was 
the main figure making or breaking the 
Premier. 
Now, the Verkhovna Rada must establish 
a coalition of factions that nominates 
a candidate for Premier and submits 
this nomination to the President. The 
President must return this nomination 
to the Verkhovna Rada for final approval 
within 15 days. Only the Verkhovna Rada 
can dismiss the Premier. The President 
can now only submit a proposal to the 
Verkhovna Rada calling for the Premier to 
be dismissed.
Appointing and dismissing the 
Government 
Previously, the President appointed and 
dismissed ministers at suggestion of 
the Premier. However, because the Head 
of Government himself could always 
be dismissed by the President, these 
nominations were largely a formality. 
Now, the Premier proposes appointments 
and dismissals that are the approved by 
the Verkhovna Rada coalition. There are 
two exceptions: the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and the Minister of Defense, 
whose nominations are submitted to the 
Verkhovna Rada by the President.  
Appointing and dismissing other top 
officials
Before, the President appointed and 
dismissed governors of local state 
administrations and the majority of top 
officials of central government bodies at 
the request of the Premier. But this was 
frequently a mere formality. To appoint 
and dismiss Chairs of the Anti-Monopoly 
Committee, State Property Fund and 
State Radio and Television Committee, 
the President needed the consent of the 
Verkhovna Rada. 
The procedure for appointing and 
dismissing governors of local state 
administrations has not changed: the 
President does this at the request of the 
Cabinet. But the Chairs of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee, State Property Fund 
and State Radio and Television Committee 
are appointed by the Verkhovna Rada at 
the request of the Premier. 
The “Public Consultations and Awareness Campaign on Political Reform in 
Ukraine” project, being implemented by ICPS and the Center for Ukrainian 
Reform Education (CURE) with financial support from the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy (WFD), is summing up preliminary results. Over 
the first quarter of 2007, public consultations were held in five cities: Lutsk, 
Dnipropetrovsk, Simferopol, Mykolayiv, and Chernivtsi. Recently, two booklets 
were published: “Political Reform as Seen by the Public” and “Political Reform 
as Seen by the Government”
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The President’s right to cancel resolutions 
by other government bodies
Previously, the President could cancel 
resolutions issued by the Cabinet or by 
the Crimean Council of Ministers. The 
President could also veto bills adopted by 
the Verkhovna Rada. In fact, the President 
frequently did not sign into law those bills 
whose veto the Verkhovna Rada had even 
overridden—which made these laws null 
and void. 
Now, the President can only suspend the 
enactment of a Cabinet resolution, if he 
thinks it is unconstitutional. Moreover, the 
President must simultaneously submit the 
specific resolution to the Constitutional 
Court for a ruling. The President can still 
overrule resolutions issued by the Crimean 
Council of Ministers. 
The President can also veto bills adopted 
by the Verkhovna Rada. However, if the 
President refuses to sign into law a bill 
whose veto has been overturned by a 
two-thirds vote, that bill can be signed and 
published by the Verkhovna Rada Speaker 
instead. 
Dissolving the Verkhovna Rada 
Before, the President had no specific power 
to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada. 
Now, the President has the right to dissolve 
the Verkhovna Rada, if a coalition has 
not been set up within 30 days or if a 
new Cabinet has not been formed within 
60 days of the dismissal of the previous 
Government. 
Original idea of reform stillborn
The initiators of political reform had as 
their main objective expanding powers 
of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet 
by shifting Presidential powers. They 
took as their example the model of a 
“parliamentary” republic, where the 
Government is formed by the legislature, 
while the President plays a secondary 
role and is actually appointed by the 
legislature. 
However, fierce political competition 
prevented that initial plan from being 
implemented. The President has remained 
a strong political figure: the Head of State 
is still elected through a national election 
and has considerable power over both the 
Cabinet and the Verkhovna Rada. 
The model of government that Ukraine 
has as a result of political reform in 2004 
does not resemble most of its European 
counterparts. It has more in common 
with a fairly eccentric “semi-presidential” 
model. Among developed European 
democracies, only France has established 
somewhat similar relations among the 
Government, the President and the 
legislature. 
The main reasons why political reform 
failed include: 
1) Lack of institutions that guarantee 
democratic rights and freedoms in 
Ukraine. The government machine is 
used as an administrative resource in 
political competition, the Constitution 
Court has proved ineffective, the 
judicial system does offer proper justice, 
the rights of the opposition are not 
enshrined in law, the organization of 
political parties fails to meet democratic 
standards, and the instruments for civil 
society to influence government exist 
only on paper.
2) Flawed legislation. The amended 
Constitution still has many holes that 
various political players have begun to 
interpret to their own liking. 
3) Undemocratic, untransparent political 
parties. The elimination of the majority 
system has hidden the human face 
of individual elected representatives 
behind a party brand. In voting for a 
party list, voters essentially choose 
a “black box” and after an election 
are soon disappointed with their own 
choice. The personal responsibility 
of every elected official to a specific 
electorate has disappeared. Moreover, 
young, innovative candidates stand 
little chance against the old political 
horses who are inevitably first on party 
lists.
4) Lack of party identity. In Ukraine, 
there are no party ideologies that are 
based on European values and reflect 
the ideological and political attitudes 
of a specific part of the population. 
Slogans like “This party represents the 
entire nation” are just a tactic to get 
elected.
Government decisions should not 
be made in a vacuum
The hastily adopted Constitutional 
amendments showed themselves for what 
they were the minute the President and 
Premier represented different political 
camps. Yet, in a parliamentary-presidential 
system, the President and Premier are 
forced to cooperate, even to cohabitate, 
when the President and Government 
represent political forces that are in 
opposition to each other. 
In short, Ukraine’s political forces 
should begin now to work on fixing 
the Constitution of Ukraine in order to 
establish an effective system of checks 
and balances. Moreover, decision-making 
should not be in isolation from voters. 
Procedures for holding public consultations 
both at the national and at the local levels 
need to be entrenched in law. 
The goal of the “Public Consultations and 
Awareness Campaign on Political Reform in 
Ukraine” project is to increase the role of 
public consultations in government decision-
making and to more broadly familiarize 
Ukrainian society, including government 
officials, with various aspects of political 
reform in Ukraine and how it might be 
implemented openly, involving public input.
For additional information, contact Viktor 
Chumak, ICPS Director of Political Analysis 
and Security Programs, by telephone 
at (380-44) 484-4400 or via e-mail at 
vchumak@icps.kiev.ua.
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By the way...
As part of the “Developing Capacity 
among Regional NGOs for Policy Analysis 
at the Local Level” project, a public 
discussion on “The current state of 
European integration, transborder 
cooperation and its impact on socio-
economic development of the Bukovyna 
region” took place in Chernivtsi 
on 23 April. Participants included 
representatives of executive bodies and 
local governments, independent experts 
and stakeholders. This project is being 
implemented by ICPS jointly with the 
Razumkov Center for Economic and 
Political Studies, with funding from the 
International Renaissance Foundation.
As part of the “Socio-Economic 
Performance and Potential Analysis 
Capacity” (SEPPAC) project, another 
series of seminars is taking place. Over 
24–27 April 2007, participants from 
the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of 
Finance and the National Bank of Ukraine 
discussed the long-term fiscal forecast 
and chapters of a future analytical report. 
The goal of this project, which is being 
funded by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), is to 
introduce mathematical mechanisms 
for evaluating both Ukraine’s economic 
potential and the socio-economic impact 
of realizing this potential. 
